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Introduction 
The 6.9 trillion dollar mutual fund industry has come under fire due to 
questionable practices conducted by mutual fund companies. Individual investors trying 
to diversify with a small amount of money have historically turned to mutual funds. 
Mutual funds were used as a safe vehicle for investors rather than buying thirty different 
stocks in order to diversify away unsystematic risk. The perception that mutual fund 
companies were acting in the best interests of individual investors has been challenged in 
the past year. Elliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, brought to light some 
illegal and highly questionable activities of mutual fund companies. These two activities 
are late trading, which is illegal, and day trading, which is not illegal but is discouraged 
in the mutual fund industry. This thesis will start out by focusing on the mutual fund 
scandal in general. Then it will focus on the day trading of international mutual funds 
followed by a hypothetical simulation to see how much money could have been made by 
day trading these funds . Finally, possible solutions to stem the practice of day trading 
will be explored. 
History 
On September 3rd , Elliot Spitzer charged Edward J. Stem, managing principal of 
Canary Investment Management LLC, with violating New York State ' s business law 
against using fraud, false statements, deception, and concealment in trading securities. 
Arrangements by Stem were made with several mutual fund companies to improperly 
trade their shares. In the opening charge no mutual fund companies were named as 
defendants, but Bank of America Corp., Bank One Corp., Janus Capital Corp., and Strong 
Capital Management Inc. were cited in the allegations (Thomas, 2003). Later, Putnam 
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was also found to have allowed both market timing and late trading of their mutual funds. 
Steven B. Markovitz, a senior trader at the $1 billion hedge fund Millennium Partners LP, 
also pleaded guilty to improper trading of mutual funds (Williamson, 2003). These 
allegations against the mutual fund industry threaten the widely held belief that individual 
investors are treated fairly by mutual fund companies in which 95 million investors in 
54.2 million households invest $6.9 trillion dollars to save money for retirement or 
college (Milstead, 2003). The illegal activities showed mutual fund companies were 
willing to bend the rules for large institutional investors at the expense of the individual 
investor. 
Spitzer claimed Stem received favorable treatment from one financial institution 
because of his father, and other mutual fund companies gave him special access because 
he promised he would keep other institutional money invested in their money market and 
mutual funds. The first allegation against Stem dealt with frequent in-and-out "timing 
trades" of mutual funds. This took advantage of the difference between closing prices of 
international stocks and the mutual fund's later closing price. Although not illegal, 
Spitzer said fund companies misled investors by stating they prohibited the practice while 
allowing people like Mr. Stem to do it. Market timers look for mutual funds that do not 
reflect the fair value of the stocks they contain. For example, when a mutual fund is 
made up of Japanese stocks the mutual fund price would be formed by using fourteen-
hour-old Japanese stock values for its price. Then if the United States stock market goes 
up, it is likely the Japanese stock market will rise allowing investors to make a quick 
profit because they buy the mutual fund using the fourteen-hour-old stock values. The 
problem is when market timers buy and sell funds in a one day time period, the fund 
5 
managers may have to sell holdings to raise the cash to pay back the investors. Janus told 
its fund owners "frequent trades in your account ... can disrupt portfolio investment 
strategies and increase fund expenses for all fund shareholders." Janus went on to say 
they might suspend or terminate trading privileges of investors engaging in day trading. 
Spitzer claims, however, that Janus gave permission to Canary to market time starting in 
April 2002. This shows a discrepancy in the way Janus deals with large institutional 
investors and individual investors (Milstead, 2003). 
The other charge dealt with late trading. Orders placed after 4 PM Eastern Time, 
are supposed to be filled at the next day's closing price under the rule of "forward 
pricing," which was established in 1968 (Smith, 2003). Stem, along with Canary, was 
allowed to conduct late trading, which is prohibited by New York's antifraud Martin Act 
and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. Canary paid a $10 million dollar 
fine and $30 million in restitution. Stem also agreed not to trade in mutual funds or 
manage public investment funds for 10 years. 
In a statement, Spitzer said "the full extent of this complicated fraud is not yet 
known," but he asserted, "The mutual-fund industry operates on a double standard" in 
which certain institutions and traders "have been given the opportunity to manipulate the 
system. They make illegal after-hours trades and improperly exploit market swings in 
ways that harm ordinary long-term investors." A study by Eric Zitzewitz, assistant 
professor of economics at Stanford University, concluded that market timing and day 
trading might cost long-term investors up to $5 billion dollars a year (Damato, 2003). 
Late trading also dilutes long-term investor's gains (Economist, 2003). The mutual fund 
companies participated because they made some extra money, and they did not believe it 
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had a huge effect on long-term investors. The mutual fund companies profited by 
obtaining interest and other fees from the day trading, as well as management fees from 
funds Canary promised to keep in money market or other funds on a long-term basis. 
Janus decided to allow day trading because of the extra money it could make. One Janus 
e-mail said, "Our stated policy is that we do not tolerate market timers however, when we 
believe allowing a limited/controlled amount of timing will be in JCG's best interests we 
will make exceptions." Another email from Richard Garland, CEO of Janus International 
Ltd. said, "I have no interest in building a business around market timers, but at the same 
time I do not want to turn away $10-20m!" These statements show Janus did not believe 
it was harming long-term investors through this practice (Smith, 2003). 
Market timing investors have many different methods to get around market timing 
policies. Mutual fund companies' watch for timers by looking for round trip trades, 
which involve multiple purchases and sales of shares in a single fund. Usually mutual 
fund companies limit how many round trip trades an investor can make. Investors get 
around this by breaking their trades into smaller amounts under $1 million dollars 
because fund companies often only monitor trades above a certain size. As long as 
investors do not cross this threshold the mutual fund company would not pay attention to 
the number of trades they make. Another method is when an investor gets shut down 
from trading in a fund; they open up a new account and get their maximum number of 
trades again from the new account (Oster, 2003). As will be shown in the simulation, 
even being allowed to market time twelve to fifteen times a year could lead to very large 
profits. 
The mutual fund company's response is to have market-timing police to try and 
identify people who are timing the market. One of the tougher jobs they have is 
monitoring trades coming from intermediaries like employee retirement plans and 
financial advisors who can package together orders from smaller accounts into big buy 
and sell transactions. Timers try to sneak their trades through these larger institutions. 
The timing police have to continue to update their techniques in order to catch these 
market timers (Oster, 2003). 
Putnam was responsible for allowing a few individual investors to make 
substantial profits over the past three years. Ten members of a New York trade union 
made more than $2 million in profits from market timing Putnam' s International Capital 
Opportunities Fund. The trading was perfectly legal for the union members, but it was 
the responsibility of Putnam to stop the excessive trading if it was against the rules laid 
out in the prospectus. At the time it seems Putnam allowed one transaction per day, 
which these union members took advantage of to achieve extraordinary profits 
(Hechinger, 2003). 
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Janus was named in the first allegations made by Elliot Spitzer, but Putnam came 
under scrutiny a month later when the fund managers themselves were discovered to be 
profiting from day trading of international funds. This day trading of mutual funds was 
being conducted in 2000, and Putnam put a stop to it right then, but did not reprimand the 
managers until late 2003. The six managers who engaged in market timing made profits 
of $700,000 before they were stopped. These violations are worse than individual 
investor's market timing because fund managers are supposed to be looking out for the 
interests of its long-term shareholders (Hechinger, 2003). 
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At least one person believes market timing is relatively unimportant if it is dealt 
with correctly. Henry Manne of the Wall Street Journal proposed the idea of charging a 
high front end fee so while market timers would have to decide if timing the market is 
worth the big fee, for long term investors this fee would be spread out over a long period 
of time. The large fee could cover the costs of managing short-term trades. In 1983 the 
SEC put a cap on these redemption fees of 2%. This price cap on fees mutual fund 
companies could charge the market timers opened the door for the practice of market 
timing. If mutual fund companies were allowed to raise this fee once again, the fee 
would compensate long-term investors for the profits lost to market timers. Even though 
this opinion declares market timing is not a big deal, it does say under the current system, 
market timing does hurt long-term investors. 
These allegations against mutual fund companies discuss how excess gains could 
be made using market timing. None of the reports tell how much money could be made, 
or what type of strategy would have to be employed to make these excess returns. This 
thesis will explore this issue by creating a market timing simulation using mutual funds 
that trade in international stocks. 
Mutual Funds 
The mutual funds chosen for this project were in the Janus and Putnam family of 
mutual funds, and they included foreign companies in their portfolio. Janus and Putnam 
were chosen because they were the two largest companies facing scrutiny for the day 
trading and late trading scandal. This section will quickly outline the different mutual 
funds, their goals, and their holdings. All of the prospectuses for the mutual funds were 
found at ,vw,v.janus.com and www.putnam.com on the individual investor' s page, under 
fund details. 
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Two of the Janus funds do not invest as heavily in foreign firms. The Janus 
Global Life Sciences Fund (JAGLX) and the Janus Global Technology Fund (JAGTX) 
have at least fifty percent of their assets invested in U.S. companies. This makes a big 
different in the results of the simulation. The rest of the Janus funds invest most of their 
assets in countries located in Europe and the Pacific Rim. The Putnam funds all heavily 
invest in foreign companies, focusing in Europe and the Pacific Rim. The mutual funds 
represent a wide variety of value to growth oriented mutual funds . They also range from 
twenty-five percent of their assets in foreign firms to almost one-hundred percent. This 
variation is a good sample from which to infer results, and their differences lead to 
different results when employing a day trading strategy. 
Simulation 
This simulations goal was to see if a day trading strategy would work in achieving 
excess returns in the international mutual fund market. This research was performed by 
comparing daily returns of the Dow Jones Industrial average as a market proxy with the 
next day' s returns of each international mutual fund. The first step was to obtain the 
daily stock prices for the market proxy and all of the individual funds, which was done by 
downloading the data from finance.yahoo.com. The entire history of daily prices was 
downloaded for each mutual fund from its inception until October 31 st of 2003. 
The daily holding period returns were computed for the market proxy and the 
mutual funds. The holding period return is found by taking today's price divided by 
yesterday's price minus 1. A filter rule was constructed in order to determine which days 
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it would be beneficial to purchase the mutual fund. If the Dow Jones Industrial average 
holding period return was over a certain amount the mutual fund should be bought at the 
end of the day, held for exactly one day and than sold in order to capture the daily return 
of the mutual fund. For this project when there was no purchase of the mutual fund, it 
was assumed the money was just held in cash. The filter rule placed on the market proxy 
allowed for sensitivity analysis by simply switching the interest rate threshold the market 
had to achieve in order to purchase the mutual fund. 
A hypothetical ten thousand dollars was placed in each mutual fund at its 
inception. The ten thousand dollars was increased by the daily holding period return for 
each day a buy recommendation was made from the filter rule on the market proxy. Days 
when there was no buy recommendation the value in the mutual fund was simply carried 
forward at its current value. This day trading amount was compared over a simple buy 
and hold strategy of the mutual fund, which was simulated by simply putting a 
hypothetical ten thousand dollars in at the inception of the mutual fund and letting it grow 
at the daily return of the mutual fund. 
The returns of the day trading strategy, the buy and hold strategy, and the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average were compared on an annual basis return. Yearly returns were 
computed for the past ten years for those mutual funds that have been in existence for that 
long. For years two through ten, the returns were computed as both an average yearly 
return over the time period and the individual return for that particular year. This allows 
for comparison both over time and year-by-year between the day trading and the buy and 
hold strategies. 
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In order to see how significant the relationship between the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average daily returns and the mutual fund daily returns was, the number of days the 
mutual fund returns went down or up after a buy recommendation was made, and the 
average positive and negative returns on these days was found. This shows the days a 
market timing strategy could be employed, the most important factor in a market timing 
strategy. All of these calculations lead to a very clear conclusion on the effectiveness of 
a day trading strategy dealing with international mutual funds. 
Assumptions were made when conducting the simulation. First, when a mutual 
fund was not being employed using market timing the assumption was the money would 
just be held in cash. No interest was earned on days the mutual fund was not traded. 
This would be an unrealistic assumption in the real world because the mutual fund could 
be held in a money market fund, or a fund that at least earned the risk free rate. This 
provides a downward bias to returns in order to strengthen the results. Another 
assumption is the yearly returns were computed by taking the amount of money the 
account would have at the beginning of the year and then looking at how much the 
mutual fund would have at the end of the year. The trading rules led to some instances 
where the mutual fund would only be traded for 12 times in a year. Another method of 
computing returns would have been to take this 12-day return and tum it into an annual 
return. This was assumed to be unrealistic because of the fact that the market timing 
strategy would only work those twelve days. You could not earn those excess returns on 
a consistent basis throughout the year. Transaction costs are assumed to be zero because 
people employing market timing strategies were able to move money from one fund to 
another without incurring transaction fees. 
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Results 
The results of the simulation show that in most cases a market timing strategy can 
be highly effective in creating excess returns. The simulation shows this type of strategy 
may be more effective during a bear market than the bull market experienced in the past 
year. Three different simulations will be used to test the significance of the market 
timing strategy. Conducting sensitivity analysis using the filter gives the three different 
results. 
The first simulation employed a filter rule of trading the mutual fund only if the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average went up by more than 2% during the day. This is the most 
extreme of the three situations, as the Dow does not go up or down by more than 2% very 
often. Employing a day trading strategy using either a ten-year investment period or the 
lifetime of the mutual fund would never have yielded a negative return on a collective 
basis (Appendix 1 ). Out of eighty-two possible yearly returns only three would have 
produced year-to-year negative return. These negative returns were contained in two of 
the Janus funds. JAGLX and JAGTX do not show as significant of gains from market 
timing as the other 11 funds (Appendix 2). The reason for this is quite clear. When 
looking at their prospectus, the two mutual funds do not have as much of an international 
presence as the rest of the mutual funds in the simulation. This explains why these funds 
do not see the significant gains. The 2% filter rule led to the most conservative results, 
due to the fact it did not produce as many trades as a lower Dow threshold. Over the long 
haul employing 2% as the filter rule led to a 10% return on average, which was very good 
during the bear market, but as soon as the bull market came back last year the filter rule 
performed badly. It earned single digit returns for most of the mutual funds, while the 
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mutual funds were earning from 20 to 30%. It seems as though this trading rule is more 
appropriate when the market is down. 
When looking at the simple year-to-year return of each mutual fund, it seems as 
though a 2% filter rule is not as volatile as the stock market. The returns over the past ten 
years range from about 6 to 20% for most of the mutual funds with the best year being in 
2002 as the market was beginning to slow down its losses, and the worst year was 2003 
when the market made its big recovery. The biggest problem with a 2% filter rule is the 
number of days the market goes up by more than 2%. From October of 2002 to October 
of 2003 there were only 12 days the market exceeded a 2% gain (Appendix 5). 
Therefore, there are fewer opportunities to make excess returns. 
The number of days a day trading strategy could be employed was found. This 
was computed by simply counting the total number of days the stock market was above 
2% and than counting how many following days the mutual fund went up or down. With 
the 2% threshold, the mutual funds had a positive following day at least 57% of the time 
and one of the mutual funds was positive 85% of the time. If you throw out the two 
funds that are not as heavily concentrated in the international markets, the other eleven 
mutual funds had a following positive day at least 70% of the time. The other point about 
the market timing strategy is that the average positive return was greater than the average 
negative return on twelve of the thirteen funds (Appendix 5). This shows that even if the 
mutual fund declined after a good day by the Dow, it was less on average than the 
positive response. With a 2% strategy there were sixty-nine days in the past five years to 
conduct market timing. This is the largest factor in leading to lower returns than the next 
two filter rule simulations. 
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Another possible strategy for market timers would be to buy when the Dow 
crossed a certain threshold and than sell if the Dow went down by that same threshold. 
This strategy is definitely not as effective as a market timing strategy. Over the long haul 
this strategy on average leads to positive returns. This method does not lead to the same 
amount of excess returns as a day trading strategy. In 2001 the buy and hold strategy 
took a big hit with most of the mutual funds experiencing significant double digit 
declines. It does lead to a consistent positive cumulative return for most of the mutual 
funds, which is better than the negative average returns these same funds have had over 
the past 6 years (Appendices 3-4). 
The filter rule was lowered to trade when the Dow was higher than 1 %. On a 
one-year basis it is apparent that in the bull market of 2003, the timing philosophy is not 
as effective as the four years prior. It still keeps up with the fund return based on a buy 
and hold strategy, but there is not much difference between the two. Once the time is 
lengthened out, however, it becomes quite apparent this strategy could lead an investor to 
large returns in excess of 20%. Over the past six years these mutual funds have taken a 
big hit, most of them have not even returned to the price they were at six years ago. At 
the same time a day-trading strategy could have netted returns in excess of 30%. As an 
example, if an investor had bought $10,000 dollars worth of PIN OX at its inception and 
held on to it until October 31 st they would have $7,750 dollars now. Over the same time 
period a market timing strategy would have about $73,000 in their account. Even 
examining the year-to-year returns of the mutual funds is staggering. Five of the funds 
earned 30% a year through 5 of the last 6 years, with a couple of the mutual funds hitting 
50% gains using the market timing strategy (Appendices 6-9). 
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As the filter rule drops the days market timing would take place significantly 
increases. The Dow exceeded a 1 % threshold 240 days over the past 5 years. Once again 
all of the mutual funds that have a significant portion of their holdings in international 
stocks traded positively after a good Dow day anywhere from 70 to 80% of the time. The 
average gain on the mutual funds after a positive Dow day was around 1 %, while the 
average loss was about 0.6%. When you consider that 70% of the time these mutual 
funds are having positive days, it becomes apparent where the excess returns come from. 
When examining the buy and hold strategies with the 1 % threshold, returns in the 30% 
range are achieved for most of the mutual funds over the past 5 years. The only 
exception would be in 2000 when this strategy would have also led to negative returns 
due to the significant drop of the markets in general (Appendix 10). 
Finally, a market timing strategy of simply buying when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average is positive gives the highest returns. On a year-to-year basis the market timing 
strategy was more successful than simply buying and holding the mutual fund on every 
occasion. The reasoning behind this is the market timing philosophy could be employed 
on 609 days in the past five years. The average positive return was 0.86% with the 
average negative return at 0.75%. With the mutual funds being higher the following day 
at least 60% of the time, extreme returns were realized over this trading time (Appendices 
11-13). 
In conclusion, this simulation showed some pretty obvious trends. The first is the 
lower the threshold the higher the excess returns which is due to the greater number of 
trading days available. With investors being able to trade freely between different mutual 
funds through pension plans or through special arrangements, large profits could be 
made. It also shows that even if trades were restricted to twelve a year, excess returns 
could be made by simply employing a larger threshold. 
Possible Solutions 
Many solutions to the mutual fund day trading scandal have been made to stop 
this type of activity. Technically, the day trading of mutual funds is not illegal; it was 
just strongly discouraged because it hurts long-term investors. The prospectuses from 
both Janus and Putnam now contain sections to discourage day trading. 
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The prospectus for Janus's mutual funds gives a clear-cut indication they do not 
allow day trading of mutual funds. On page 63 of the online shareholder manual they 
discuss their exchange policies. An exchange involves moving money from one mutual 
fund in the Janus family to another fund in the same family. In the prospectus it says the 
exchange privileges will not be used for short term or excessive trading. They discourage 
this by allowing only four roundtrip exchanges in one twelve month period. By a 
roundtrip exchange they mean selling a mutual fund only to buy back into it recently after 
the sale. They also reserve the right to not allow an exchange to happen for no reason at 
all. The prospectus also says an exchange made dealing with any of their foreign mutual 
funds could be subject to a redemption fee. This fee is currently placed at one percent, 
but it was raised to two percent on March 1, 2004. This is obviously another step in order 
to discourage short term trading as this redemption fee is placed on any exchange made 
within three months of a previous exchange. On page 65 of the prospectus there is a 
whole section on how Janus deals with excessive trading. In this section they claim 
mutual funds are intended to me long term investment vehicles only, and excessive 
trading is discouraged. It is discouraged because excessive short term trading can disrupt 
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the management of the fund and cause long-term investors to incur costs they should not. 
Janus also says, however, they may have trouble detecting excessive trading when 
conducted by a financial intermediary. All of these statements make it very clear that 
Janus does not condone day trading of its international funds. Putnam's prospectuses 
were set up the same way. 
The SEC has a few new guidelines for mutual fund companies. The SEC will 
require mutual funds to impose a minimum two percent redemption fee for sales of 
mutual funds within five days of purchase. Janus has taken this one step further by 
imposing this fee when a sale is made within ninety days of purchase. This would be 
imposed on all funds except money market funds and any other mutual funds that are 
designed to handle market timing. The Investment Company Institute president Matt Fink 
said, "One hundred percent of redemption-fee proceeds would go to the fund and would 
thus benefit the fund's long-term shareholders" (Svaldi, 2003). This increased fee would 
theoretically be enough to cover the cost of fulfilling the mutual fund sell orders, and 
would not cut into the profits of long-long term shareholders. The important point is 
mutual fund companies must apply this fee to everyone equally. A lot of mutual fund 
companies had these fees in place earlier, but were allowing certain market timers to not 
pay this fee in order to secure their business. 
Other proposed rules to stem market timing include requiring mutual fund 
companies to explicitly disclose the fund's policy on market timing in fund offering 
documents. This would allow investors to know whether the fund is serious about 
discouraging market timing from happening. They also want mutual funds to clarify to 
their employees that they are barred from misusing material, non-public information 
when trading portfolio holdings. The final proposal by the SEC would require mutual 
fund companies, along with their investment advisors, to have a compliance officer to 
answer to the fund ' s board, and to put compliance procedures in place to make sure 
violations of federal securities law are not being broken (Anderson, 2003). All of these 
proposed changes would help protect long-term investors from day trading and late 
trading. 
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Due to the problem with mutual funds, other investment vehicles are becoming 
more prominent for investors. Exchange traded funds are set up the same way as mutual 
funds except they trade like stocks. The prices are adjusted throughout the day to reflect 
what the stock' s managers feel is the value of the stocks in the fund. This solves the 
problem of sticky prices when dealing with mutual funds. There is talk of mutual funds 
being priced the same way, but at this time the process of converting to a market value 
price is still in its early stages (Solomon, 2003). 
Conclusion 
This paper shows the importance ofregulating the mutual fund industry. Without 
regulation, long-term investors will be hurt through increased expenses and loss of long-
term gains due to market timing by certain individuals. The simulation showed how 
excess returns can be earned using a market timing system trading as few as twelve times 
a year. If the mutual fund companies do not get their problems straightened out, 
investors will continue to tum to new investment vehicles like exchange traded funds. 
The SEC and mutual fund companies are imposing new regulations to stem the illegal 
and unethical practice of mutual fund companies in order to try and reinstall confidence 
of safety to the average investor. 
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Appendix 1 
Cumulative Returns based on a 2% filter rule 
2003 2002-03 2001-03 2000-03 1999-03 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX 2.63% 13.87% 5.17% -6.81% 1.16% -13.03% 4.37% 1.82% 
JAGTX 5.44% 41 .08% 1.92% 0.91% 0.86% -25.85% 6.42% -14.53% 
JGVAX 2.85% 34.95% 7.71% 10.24% 
JAOSX 7.33% 27.62% 13.12% 3.97% 10.76% -15.15% 10.85% -7.29% 10.62% 1.04% 
JAWWX 4.25% 14.65% 9.84% -2.15% 7.77% -18.08% 9.43% -11 .65% 8.95% -2.88% 
PINOX 7.54% 23.91% 13.26% 5.49% 11 .26% -18.02% 11 .18% -16.94% 11 .03% -5.53% 
PINWX 7.34% 23.07% 13.20% 4.68% 11 .18% -18.85% 11 .12% -17.75% 10.97% -6.42% 
PIOCX 7.40% 23.21% 13.23% 4.84% 11 .21% -18 .63% 
PINMX 7.88% 23.35% 13.41% 5.05% 11 .33% -18.51% 11 .27% -17.43% 11 .10% -6 .06% 
PEUGX 5.82% 18.48% 13.55% -1 .06% 10.68% -12 .21% 11 .17% -8.36% 10.48% -5 .11 % 
PEQUX 2.92% 20.32% 7.57% 1.56% 5.21% -21 .39% 8.18% -16.57% 7.78% -7.84% 
POVSX 8.23% 18.47% 14.12% 1.37% 11.22% -9.74% 11 .56% -5.62% 11 .09% 1.42% 
PNGAX 8.54% 24.80% 13.33% 5.35% 10.10% -7.28% 10.21% -8.06% 9.84% -2.49% 
Dow 16.72% 3.92% -3.69% -2.05% 2.67% 
Average 6.01% 23.67% 10.72% 2.57% 8.56% -16.40% 9.62% -11 .12% 10.21% -3.76% 
Number of Days 12 365 25 365 11 365 12 365 9 365 
in the Market 




JAOSX 10.94% 1.59% 10.85% 4.21% 9.52% 7.09% 
JAWWX 9.01% -1 .26% 9.05% 1.08% 7.96% 3.93% 7.04% 4.00% 6.42% 5.01% 
PINOX 11.45% -5.24% 11 .22% -3.55% 
PINWX 11.41% -6.13% 11 .17% -4.42% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 11.53% -5.79% 11 .32% -4.10% 
PEUGX 10.83% -2.37% 10.58% 0.43% 
PEQUX 7.89% -7.58% 7.86% -5.15% 6.87% -3.21% 6.08% -2.64% 5.57% -1 .74% 
POVSX 11.27% 2.33% 11 .09% 4.96% 
PNGAX 10.22% -1 .23% 
Dow 4.70% 7.19% 9.46% 10.76% 10.29% 
AveraQe 10.51% -2.85% 10.39% -0.82% 8.12% 2.60% 6.56% 0.68% 5.99% 1.63% 
Appendix 2 
Year-to-Year Returns based on a 2% filter rule 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
., - - - - - - - -
JAGLX 2.63% 13.87% 7.77% -23.74% -6.41% -24.25% 14.63% 63.42% 
JAGTX 5.44% 41 .08% -1.47% -27.83% -1 .24% -59.96% 25.01% 30.93% 
JGVAX 2.85% 34.95% 12.79% -9.94% 
JAOSX 7.33% 27.62% 19.21% -15.30% 6.20% -43.49% 11 .12% 20.97% 9.68% 42.51% 
JAWWX 4.25% 14.65% 15.72% -16.48% 3.77% -42.59% 14.54% 10.84% 7.04% 41 .79% 
PINOX 7.54% 23.91% 19.28% -10.19% 7.35% -50.49% 10.97% -13.61% 10.39% 58.05% 
PINWX 7.34% 23.07% 19.39% -10.97% 7.25% -51.22% 10.93% -14.37% 10.36% 56.84% 
PIOCX 7.40% 23.21% 19.37% -10.79% 7.30% -50.99% 
PINMX 7.88% 23.35% 19.23% -10.53% 7.29% -50.97% 11 .08% -14.07% 10.42% 57.36% 
PEUGX 5.82% 18.48% 21 .84% -17.37% 5.14% -30.88% 12.68% 4.22% 7.77% 9.08% 
PEQUX 2.92% 20.32% 12.42% -14.28% 0.65% -52.91% 17.61% -0.27% 6.21% 37.20% 
POVSX 8.23% 18.47% 20.33% -13.25% 5.64% -28.43% 12.59% 7.89% 9.19% 35.23% 
PNGAX 8.54% 24.80% 18.33% -11 .07% 3.92% -28.19% 10.55% -10.36% 8.37% 23.39% 
Dow 16.72% -7.47% -17.28% 3.03% 23.93% 
Averaqe 6.01% 23.67% 15.71% -14.75% 3.91% -42 .86% 13.79% 7.78% 8.83% 40.16% 
Number of Days 12 365 25 365 11 365 12 365 9 365 
in the Market 




JAOSX 12.57% 4.38% 10.34% 21.45% 0.61% 29.59% 
JAWWX 9.33% 7.26% 9.32% 16.33% 0.61% 26.26% 0.00% 4.56% 0.98% 14.59% 
PINOX 13.57% -3.77% 9.91% 7.24% 
PINWX 13.63% -4.72% 9.73% 6.57% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 13.72% -4.45% 10.04% 6.72% 
PEUGX 12.59% 12.57% 9.09% 18.99% 
PEQUX 8.42% -6.26% 7.66% 10.83% 0.21% 11 .55% 0.00% 2.05% 1.04% 6.69% 
POVSX 12.19% 7.02% 10.00% 22.17% 
PNGAX 12.15% 5.31% 
Dow 15.45% 23.43% 26.79% 21 .68% 6.18% 
Average 12.02% 1.93% 9.51% 13.79% 0.48% 22.47% 0.00% 3.31% 1.01% 10.64% 
Appendix 3 
Year-to-Year Returns for a Buy and Hold Strategy based on a 2% filter rule 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX 11 .01 % 13.87% -10.73% -23.74% 1.56% -24.25% 36.26% 63.42% 
JAGTX 21 .42% 41 .08% -10.73% -27.83% -45.78% -59.96% 46.70% 30.93% 
JGVAX 27.10% 34.95% 27.25% -9.94% 
JAOSX 26.82% 27.62% 21.99% -15.30% -16.34% -43.49% 41 .03% 20.97% 2.35% 42.51% 
JAWWX 11 .76% 14.65% 14.17% -16.48% -19.32% -42.59% 31 .10% 10.84% 1.81% 41 .79% 
PINOX 18.27% 23.91% 28.49% -10.19% -30.97% -50.49% 33.11% -13.61% 0.75% 58.05% 
PINWX 17.76% 23.07% 28.11% -10.97% -31 .86% -51 .22% 32.50% -14.37% 0.52% 56.84% 
PIOCX 18.04% 23.21% 28.46% -10.79% -31 .55% -50.99% 
PINMX 18.15% 23.35% 28.19% -10.53% -31.49% -50.97% 32.78% -14.07% 0.65% 57.36% 
PEUGX 10.38% 18.48% 28.15% -17.37% -13.68% -30.88% 20.41% 4.22% -8.74% 9.08% 
PEQUX 14.30% 20.32% 12.38% -14.28% -38.27% -52.91 % 24.68% -0 .27% -3.31% 37.20% 
POVSX 14.55% 18.47% 26.36% -13.25% -11.11% -28.43% 34.69% 7.89% 0.09% 35.23% 
PNGAX 21 .60% 24.80% 30.59% -11 .07% -13.48% -28.19% 3.45% -10.76% 1.23% 23.39% 
Dow 16.72% -7.47% -17.28% 3.03% 23.93% 
Average 17.78% 23.67% 19.44% -14.75% -23.53% -42.86% 30.61% 7.74% -0.52% 40.16% 
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 




JAOSX 25.53% 4.38% 23.82% 21.45% 16.39% 29.59% 
JAWWX 14.63% 7.26% 24.45% 16.33% 14.08% 26.26% -3 .30% 4.56% 9.98% 14.59% 
PINOX 9.52% -3 .77% 16.82% 7.24% 
PINWX 8.86% -4.72% 16.33% 6.57% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 8.84% -4.45% 16.72% 6.72% 
PEUGX 23.95% 12.57% 22.41% 18.99% 
PEQUX -3.63% -6.26% 20.95% 10.83% 6.28% 11 .55% -4.86% 2.05% 7.06% 6.69% 
POVSX 14.23% 7.02% 24.42% 22.17% 
PNGAX 13.69% 5.31% 
Dow 15.45% 23.43% 26.79% 21 .68% 6.18% 
Average 12.84% 1.93% 20.74% 13.79% 12.25% 22.47% -4.08% 3.31% 8.52% 10.64% 
Appendix 4 
Cumulative Returns for a Buy and Hold Strategy based on a 2% filter rule 
2003 2002-03 2001 -03 2000-03 1999-03 
Dav Trade Fund , Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund , Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX 11 .01% 13.87% -0.45% -6 .81% 0.21% -13.03% 8.22% 1.82% 
JAGTX 21.42% 41 .08% 4.11% 0.91% -16.24% -25.85% -3 .64% -14.53% 
JGVAX 27.10% 34.95% 27.18% 10.24% 
JAOSX 26.82% 27.62% 24.38% 3.97% 8.98% -15.15% 16.24% -7 .29% 13.32% 1.04% 
JAWWX 11 .76% 14.65% 12.96% -2 .15% 0.98% -18.08% 7.79% -11 .65% 6.56% -2 .88% 
PINOX 18.27% 23.91% 23.28% 5.49% 1.61% -18.02% 8.71% -16.94% 7.07% -5 .53% 
PINWX 17.76% 23.07% 22.83% 4.68% 0.92% -18.85% 8.03% -17.75% 6.48% -6.42% 
PIOCX 18.04% 23.21% 23.14% 4.84% 1.25% -18.63% 
PINMX 18.15% 23.35% 23.07% 5.05% 1.24% -18.51 % 8.34% -17.43% 6.76% -6 .06% 
PEUGX 10.38% 18.48% 18.94% -1 .06% 6.88% -12.21% 10.12% -8.36% 6.06% -5.11% 
PEQUX 14.30% 20.32% 13.34% 1.56% -7.44% -21 .39% -0.29% -16.57% -0.90% -7.84% 
POVSX 14.55% 18.47% 20.31% 1.37% 8.76% -9.74% 14.74% -5.62% 11 .64% 1.42% 
PNGAX 21 .60% 24.80% 26.01% 5.35% 11 .17% -7.28% 9.19% -8.17% 7.55% -2 .58% 
Dow 16.72% 3.92% -3 .69% -2 .05% 2.67% 
Average 17.78% 23.67% 18.39% 2.57% 1.53% -16.40% 7.95% -11 .13% 7.17% -3 .77% 
1998-03 1997-03 1996-03 1995-03 1994-03 




JAOSX 15.27% 1.59% 16.45% 4.21% 16.44% 7.09% 
JAWWX 7.87% -1 .26% 10.09% 1.08% 10.58% 3.93% 8.95% 4.00% 9.05% 5.01% 
PINOX 7.47% -5.24% 8.76% -3.55% 
PINWX 6.88% -6.13% 8.18% -4.42% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 7.10% -5.79% 8.42% -4.10% 
PEUGX 8.85% -2 .37% 10.69% 0.43% 
PEQUX -1.36% -7.58% 1.56% -5.15% 2.14% -3.21 % 1.33% -2.64% 1.89% -1.74% 
POVSX 12.07% 2.33% 13.76% 4.96% 
PNGAX 8.55% -1 .31% 
Dow 4.70% 7.19% 9.46% 10.76% 10.29% 
Average 8.08% -2.86% 9.74% -0.82% 9.72% 2.60% 5.14% 0.68% 5.47% 1.63% 
Appendix 5 
Total Number of Days Market Timing would have been employed over the last ten years 
Using a 2% filter rule 











































Number of Total Market Timing Days 
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12 25 11 
Average 
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Cumulative Returns based on a 1% filter rule 
2003 2002-03 2001-03 2000-03 1999-03 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX 5.39% 13.87% 4.46% -6.81% 4.57% -13.03% 14.98% 1.82% 
JAGTX 18.14% 41 .08% 8.40% 0.91% 8.75% -25.85% 14.75% -14.53% 
JGVAX 22.28% 34.95% 21 .29% 10.24% 
JAOSX 25.55% 27.62% 28.70% 3.97% 27.44% -15.15% 27.46% -7.29% 29.31% 1.04% 
JAWWX 13.34% 14.65% 18.11 % -2 .15% 18.34% -18.08% 19.15% -11 .65% 20.08% -2.88% 
PINOX 22.95% 23.91% 28.84% 5.49% 29.60% -18.02% 29.74% -16 .94% 33.57% -5.53% 
PINWX 23.33% 23.07% 28.77% 4.68% 29.40% -18.85% 29.52% -17 .75% 33.35% -6.42% 
PIOCX 23.22% 23.21% 29.11% 4.84% 29.67% -18.63% 
PINMX 23.68% 23.35% 29.02% 5.05% 29.53% -18.51% 29.67% -17.43% 33.54% -6 .06% 
PEUGX 21 .11% 18.48% 27.82% -1.06% 29.34% -12 .21% 29.88% -8.36% 27.67% -5.11% 
PEQUX 11.03% 20.32% 13.93% 1.56% 13.52% -21 .39% 17.33% -16.57% 18.64% -7 .84% 
POVSX 25.92% 18.47% 31 .52% 1.37% 31 .24% -9.74% 31 .69% -5.62% 32.19% 1.42% 
PNGAX 26.40% 24.80% 29.86% 5.35% 29.18% -7.28% 27.86% -8.06% 27.25% -2.49% 
Dow 16.72% 3.92% -3.69% -2.05% 2.67% 
Average 20.18% 23.67% 23.06% 2.57% 23.38% -16.40% 24.73% -11.12% 28.40% -3.76% 
Number of Days 41 365 54 365 48 365 45 365 52 365 
in the Market 




JAOSX 30.32% 1.59% 30.08% 4.21% 27.56% 7.09% 
JAWWX 21 .24% -1 .26% 22.01% 1.08% 20.77% 3.93% 19.02% 4.00% 17.68% 5.01% 
PINOX 34.91% -5.24% 32.77% -3.55% 
PINWX 34.67% -6.13% 32.62% -4.42% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 34.85% -5.79% 32.81% -4.10% 
PEUGX 30.16% -2.37% 29.03% 0.43% 
PEQUX 20.14% -7 .58% 19.16% -5.15% 17.89% -3.21% 16.51% -2.64% 15.48% -1.74% 
POVSX 34.23% 2.33% 33.14% 4.96% 
PNGAX 30.14% -1 .23% 
Dow 4.70% 7.19% 9.46% 10.76% 10.29% 
Average 30.07% -2 .85% 28.95% -0.82% 22.07% 2.60% 17.77% 0.68% 16.58% 1.63% 
Appendix 7 
Year-to-Year Returns based on using a 1% filter rule 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Dav Trade Fund , Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund , Dav Trade Fund , 
JAGLX 5.39% 13.87% 3.55% -23.74% 4.77% -24.25% 52.87% 63.42% 
JAGTX 18.14% 41 .08% -0.53% -27.83% 9.45% -59.96% 34.78% 30.93% 
JGVAX 22.28% 34.95% 20.31% -9.94% 
JAOSX 25.55% 27.62% 31 .94% -15.30% 24.97% -43.49% 27.51% 20.97% 37.00% 42.51% 
JAWWX 13.34% 14.65% 23.08% -16.48% 18.80% -42.59% 21 .63% 10.84% 23.86% 41 .79% 
PINOX 22.95% 23.91% 35.01% -10.19% 31 .13% -50.49% 30.15% -13.61% 50.05% 58.05% 
PINWX 23.33% 23.07% 34.45% -10.97% 30.66% -51.22% 29.89% -14.37% 49.83% 56.84% 
PIOCX 23.22% 23.21% 35.28% -10.79% 30.80% -50.99% 
PINMX 23.68% 23.35% 34.59% -10.53% 30.56% -50.97% 30.07% -14.07% 50.24% 57.36% 
PEUGX 21.11% 18.48% 34.91% -17.37% 32.45% -30.88% 31.49% 4.22% 19.19% 9.08% 
PEQUX 11.03% 20.32% 16.91% -14.28% 12.70% -52 .91% 29.55% -0.27% 24.01% 37.20% 
POVSX 25.92% 18.47% 37.38% -13.25% 30.67% -28.43% 33.04% 7.89% 34.24% 35.23% 
PNGAX 26.40% 24.80% 33.41% -11 .07% 27.84% -28.19% 23.97% -10.36% 24.83% 23.39% 
Dow 16.72% -7.47% -17.28% 3.03% 23.93% 
Average 20.18% 23.67% 26.18% -14.75% 23.73% -42 .86% 31 .36% 7.78% 34.81% 40.16% 
Number of Days 41 365 54 365 48 365 45 365 52 365 
in the Market 
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 




JAOSX 35.45% 4.38% 28.66% 21 .45% 11 .21% 29.59% 
JAWWX 27.23% 7.26% 26.73% 16.33% 12.43% 26.26% 5.93% 4.56% 6.22% 14.59% 
PINOX 41 .83% -3.77% 20.64% 7.24% 
PINWX 41.46% -4.72% 20.99% 6.57% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 41 .60% -4.45% 21 .22% 6.72% 
PEUGX 43.35% 12.57% 22.51% 18.99% 
PEQUX 27.93% -6.26% 13.44% 10.83% 9.42% 11 .55% 6.04% 2.05% 6.61% 6.69% 
POVSX 44.89% 7.02% 26.79% 22.17% 
PNGAX 45.60% 5.31% 
Dow 15.45% 23.43% 26.79% 21 .68% 6.18% 
AveraQe 38.81% 1.93% 22.62% 13.79% 11 .02% 22.47% 5.98% 3.31% 6.41% 10.64% 
Appendix 8 
Cumulative Returns for a Buy and Hold Strategy based on a 1 % filter rule 
2003 2002-03 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX -0 .55% 13.87% -1 .79% -6.81% 
JAGTX 33.21% 41 .08% 9.12% 0.91% 
JGVAX 41 .36% 34.95% 34.90% 10.24% 
JAOSX 45.35% 27.62% 42.82% 3.97% 
JAWWX 16.36% 14.65% 20.65% -2 .15% 
PINOX 39.13% 23.91% 38.30% 5.49% 
PINWX 38.46% 23.07% 37.75% 4.68% 
PIOCX 38.50% 23.21% 38.18% 4.84% 
PINMX 39.09% 23.35% 37.72% 5.05% 
PEUGX 30.97% 18.48% 34.65% -1 .06% 
PEQUX 14.82% 20.32% 15.59% 1.56% 
POVSX 39.06% 18.47% 38.68% 1.37% 
PNGAX 40.32% 24.80% 39.19% 5.35% 
Dow 16.72% 3.92% 



































36.98% -7.29% 41 .07% 
19.14% -11.65% 23.47% 
28.17% -16.94% 37.93% 
27.29% -17.75% 37.01% 
27.53% -17.43% 37.32% 
30.28% -8.36% 28.63% 
8.46% -16.57% 14.44% 
35.43% -5.62% 39.31% 
28.68% -8 .17% 30.92% 
-2 .05% 

















JAOSX 39.13% 1.59% 40.45% 4.21% 38.80% 7.09% 
JAWWX 23.60% -1 .26% 25.56% 1.08% 25.69% 3.93% 23.67% 4.00% 21 .94% 5.01% 
PINOX 36.88% -5 .24% 37.98% -3 .55% 
PINWX 36.01% -6.13% 37.20% -4.42% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 36.30% -5.79% 37.50% -4.10% 
PEUGX 30.82% -2.37% 33.04% 0.43% 
PEQUX 15.74% -7.58% 18.14% -5.15% 17.63% -3.21% 16.57% -2 .64% 15.56% -1 .74% 
POVSX 38.72% 2.33% 41 .07% 4.96% 
PNGAX 31.51% -1 .31% 
Dow 4.70% 7.19% 9.46% 10.76% 10.29% 
Average 32.08% -2.86% 33.87% -0.82% 27.38% 2.60% 20.12% 0.68% 18.75% 1.63% 
Appendix 9 
Year-to-Year Returns for a Buy and Hold Strategy based on a 1% filter rule 
2003 2002 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX -0.55% 13.87% -3.01% -23.74% 
JAGTX 33.21% 41 .08% -10.61% -27.83% 
JGVAX 41 .36% 34.95% 28.75% -9.94% 
JAOSX 45.35% 27.62% 40.33% -15.30% 
JAWWX 16.36% 14.65% 25.10% -16.48% 
PINOX 39.13% 23.91% 37.48% -10.19% 
PINWX 38.46% 23.07% 37.04% -10.97% 
PIOCX 38.50% 23.21% 37.86% -10.79% 
PINMX 39.09% 23.35% 36.35% -10.53% 
PEUGX 30.97% 18.48% 38.43% -17.37% 
PEQUX 14.82% 20.32% 16.36% -14.28% 
POVSX 39.06% 18.47% 38.30% -13.25% 
PNGAX 40.32% 24.80% 38.07% -11 .07% 
Dow 16.72% -7.47% 





JAOSX 29.80% 4.38% 48.63% 21.45% 
JAWWX 24.25% 7.26% 37.96% 16.33% 
PINOX 31 .71% -3 .77% 44.79% 7.24% 
PINWX 31 .10% -4 .72% 44.59% 6.57% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 31 .30% -4.45% 44.97% 6.72% 
PEUGX 42.34% 12.57% 47.18% 18.99% 
PEQUX 22.44% -6 .26% 33.66% 10.83% 
POVSX 35.84% 7.02% 55.98% 22.17% 
PNGAX 34.46% 5.31% 
Dow 15.45% 23.43% 
Average 31.47% 1.93% 44.72% 13.79% 
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Total Number of Days Market Timing would have been employed over the last ten years 
Using a 1 % filter rule 
# of Total Days Average 
Neg Pos Positive% Avg Neg Return Avg Pos Return Dow Neg Return Dow Pos Return 
JAGLX 94 130 58.04% -0.91 % 1.23% 1.85% 1.85% 
JAGTX 90 132 59.46% -1 .69% 1.86% 1.80% 1.88% 
JGVAX 27 74 73.27% -0.71% 0.93% 2.14% 1.96% 
JAOSX 87 260 74.93% -0.69% 0.99% 1.71% 1.76% 
JAWWX 101 272 72.92% -0.72% 0.87% 1.73% 1.73% 
PINOX 90 238 72.56% -0.63% 1.09% 1.70% 1.81% 
PINWX 86 239 73.54% -0.67% 1.09% 1.70% 1.81% 
PIOCX 45 119 72.56% -0.81% 1.13% 1.77% 1.93% 
PINMX 86 239 73.54% -0.67% 1.09% 1.68% 1.81% 
PEUGX 99 236 70.45% -0.72% 1.08% 1.75% 1.79% 
PEQUX 169 427 71 .64% -0.80% 0.88% 1.70% 1.72% 
POVSX 69 261 79.09% -0.67% 0.96% 1.67% 1.80% 
PNGAX 75 236 75.88% -0.57% 0.94% 1.67% 1.82% 
Average Returns -0.70% 1.00% 
Number of Total Market Timing Days 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
41 54 48 45 52 
Appendix 11 
Cumulative Returns based on a 0% filter rule 
2003 2002-03 2001-03 2000-03 1999-03 
Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund Dav Trade Fund 
JAGLX 7.45% 13.87% 0.83% -6.81% -0.76% -13 .03% 13.44% 1.82% 
JAGTX 50.14% 41 .08% 12.66% 0.91% 0.83% -25.85% 11 .75% -14.53% 
JGVAX 64.66% 34.95% 49.27% 10.24% 
JAOSX 66.91% 27.62% 56.75% 3.97% 41 .86% -15.15% 46.65% -7.29% 50.14% 1.04% 
JAWWX 27.32% 14.65% 26.69% -2.15% 19.78% -18.08% 24.00% -11 .65% 28.24% -2 .88% 
PINOX 58.58% 23.91% 52.99% 5.49% 42.30% -18.02% 41 .98% -16.94% 52.59% -5.53% 
PINWX 59.43% 23.07% 53.36% 4.68% 42.09% -18.85% 41 .68% -17.75% 52.24% -6.42% 
PIOCX 59.42% 23.21% 53.93% 4.84% 42.85% -18.63% 
PINMX 59.55% 23.35% 53.17% 5.05% 42.27% -18.51% 41 .90% -17.43% 52.47% -6.06% 
PEUGX 52.67% 18.48% 53.94% -1 .06% 45.56% -12.21% 45.25% -8.36% 42.48% -5.11 % 
PEQUX 19.45% 20.32% 16.70% 1.56% 9.62% -21.39% 15.32% -16.57% 21 .50% -7.84% 
POVSX 55.56% 18.47% 55.70% 1.37% 45.34% -9.74% 47.17% -5.62% 51.23% 1.42% 
PNGAX 57.65% 24.80% 55.51% 5.35% 44.92% -7.28% 38.15% -8.06% 40.42% -2.49% 
Dow 16.72% 3.92% -3.69% -2.05% 2.67% 
Average 49.14% 23.67% 41 .65% 2.57% 31 .39% -16.40% 33.39% -11 .12% 43.48% -3.76% 
Number of Days 130 365 117 365 117 365 122 365 123 365 
in the Market 
1998-03 1997-03 1996-03 1995-03 1994-03 




JAOSX 50.98% 1.59% 50.75% 4.21% 49.91% 7.09% 
JAWWX 30.65% -1 .26% 31 .79% 1.08% 33.00% 3.93% 32.29% 4.00% 31.96% 5.01% 
PINOX 55.52% -5.24% 53.05% -3.55% 
PINWX 55.08% -6.13% 52.79% -4.42% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 55.44% -5.79% 52.97% -4.10% 
PEUGX 47.48% -2.37% 47.13% 0.43% 
PEQUX 27.46% -7.58% 28.63% -5.15% 27.95% -3.21% 27.69% -2.64% 27.40% -1 .74% 
POVSX 53.68% 2.33% 53.36% 4.96% 
PNGAX 44.40% -1 .23% 
Dow 4.70% 7.19% 9.46% 10.76% 10.29% 
Average 46.74% -2.85% 46.31% -0.82% 36.95% 2.60% 29.99% 0.68% 29.68% 1.63% 
Appendix 12 
Year-to-Year Returns based on a 0% filter rule 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
JAGLX 7.45% 13.87% -5.39% -23.74% -3.87% -24.25% 69.47% 63.42% 
JAGTX 50.14% 41 .08% -15.47% -27.83% -19.22% -59.96% 52.11% 30.93% 
JGVAX 64.66% 34.95% 35.32% -9.94% 
JAOSX 66.91% 27.62% 47.21% -15.30% 16.17% -43.49% 62.05% 20.97% 64.92% 42.51% 
JAWWX 27.32% 14.65% 26.06% -16.48% 7.07% -42.59% 37.60% 10.84% 46.70% 41 .79% 
PINOX 58.58% 23.91% 47.59% -10.19% 23.12% -50.49% 41.01% -13.61% 103.58% 58.05% 
PINWX 59.43% 23.07% 47.51% -10.97% 21 .97% -51 .22% 40.46% -14.37% 102.97% 56.84% 
PIOCX 59.42% 23.21% 48.62% -10.79% 23.04% -50.99% 
PINMX 59.55% 23.35% 47.05% -10.53% 22.73% -50.97% 40.80% -14.07% 103.24% 57.36% 
PEUGX 52.67% 18.48% 55.22% -17.37% 30.15% -30.88% 44.32% 4.22% 31 .94% 9.08% 
PEQUX 19.45% 20.32% 14.02% -14.28% -3.28% -52.91% 34.25% -0.27% 49.74% 37.20% 
POVSX 55.56% 18.47% 55.83% -13.25% 26.65% -28.43% 52.81 % 7.89% 68.59% 35.23% 
PNGAX 57.65% 24.80% 53.39% -11 .07% 25.87% -28.19% 19.67% -10.36% 49.87% 23.39% 
Dow 16.72% -7.47% -17.28% 3.03% 23.93% 
Averaqe 49.14% 23.67% 35.15% -14.75% 14.20% -42.86% 44.96% 7.78% 69.06% 40.16% 
Number of Days 130 365 117 365 117 365 122 365 123 365 
in the Market 
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 




JAOSX 55.24% 4.38% 49.38% 21.45% 44.17% 29.59% 
JAWWX 43.38% 7.26% 38.80% 16.33% 41 .81% 26.26% 26.72% 4.56% 29.07% 14.59% 
PINOX 71 .02% -3.77% 39.03% 7.24% 
PINWX 70.09% -4.72% 39.76% 6.57% 
PIOCX 
PINMX 71 .19% -4.45% 38.96% 6.72% 
PEUGX 75.24% 12.57% 45.03% 18.99% 
PEQUX 61 .92% -6.26% 35.91% 10.83% 23.23% 11 .55% 25.68% 2.05% 24.80% 6.69% 
POVSX 66.56% 7.02% 51.47% 22.17% 
PNGAX 66.07% 5.31% 
Dow 15.45% 23.43% 26.79% 21 .68% 6.18% 
Averaqe 64.52% 1.93% 42.29% 13.79% 36.40% 22.47% 26.20% 3.31% 26.93% 10.64% 
Appendix 13 
Total Number of Days Market Timing would have been employed over the last ten years 
Using a 0% filter rule 
# of Total Days Average 
Neg Pos 
264 





















































Number of Total Market Timing Days 
2003 2002 2001 
130 117 117 
-1 .70% 
-0.67% 
-0.74% 
-0.68% 
-0.80% 
-0.82% 
-0.92% 
-0.81% 
-0.80% 
-0.66% 
-0.74% 
-0.70% 
-0.76% 
2000 
122 
1.74% 
0.90% 
0.83% 
0.71% 
0.93% 
0.93% 
1.00% 
0.93% 
0.95% 
0.69% 
0.84% 
0.84% 
0.87% 
1999 
123 
0.92% 
0.97% 
0.78% 
0.70% 
0.81% 
0.80% 
0.81% 
0.79% 
0.83% 
0.68% 
0.73% 
0.78% 
1.07% 
1.13% 
0.95% 
0.86% 
1.01% 
1.00% 
1.13% 
1.00% 
1.01% 
0.84% 
1.03% 
1.07% 
